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Abstract In the finite blocklength scenario, which is suitable for practical applications, a method of max-
imizing the average effective secrecy rate (AESR), significantly distinct from the infinite case, is proposed to
optimize the UAV trajectory and transmit power subject to UAV mobility constraints and transmit power
constraints. To address the formulated non-convex optimization problem, it is first decomposed into two
non-convex subproblems. Then the two subproblems are converted respectively into two convex subproblems
via the first-order approximation. Finally, an alternating iteration algorithm is developed by solving the two
subproblems iteratively using successive convex approximation (SCA) technique. Numerical results show
that our proposed scheme achieves a better AESR performance than a benchmark scheme.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, with the rapid development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) manufacturing, the
functions of UAVs have become diversified, and they are playing an increasingly important role in the
fields of military, search, rescue, surveillance, cargo delivery, telecommunications, etc. Especially in the
field of telecommunications, UAVs have been considered as one of the significant component of the fifth
generation (5G) wireless system due to the advantages of low cost, high mobility, flexible deployment
and high probabilities of line of sight (LoS) channels [1–4], which attracts extensive attention from
industry and academia. For example, in industry, Qualcomm have joined forces with AT&T to trial
UAVs operation on AT&T’s commercial networks to accelerate wide-scale wireless coverage [5], and they
have worked together to optimize the commercial networks for UAV communications to pave the path to
5G [6]. At the same time, in academia, a lot of effort has been made in the research of UAV networks,
and many valuable research results have been achieved. For example, in [7], a UAV was deployed to
serve as a aerial base station to communicate with ground users in time division multiple access (TDMA)
manner. By optimizing the UAV trajectory and user scheduling, the max-min average rate can be
achieved. Furthermore, the scenario of multi-UAV operating in a cooperation manner was considered
in [8]. In addition to acting as the aerial base station, UAV can also act as the mobile relay when there
is no direct link between transmitter and receiver [9]. Besides, in recent work [10], a UAV is deployed
as the mobile data collector to collect data from sensor nodes. Moreover, taking energy efficiency into
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consideration [11], the authors of [12] aimed to maximize the energy efficiency of UAV networks by
optimizing UAV’s trajectory.
On the other hand, note that the traditional terrestrial wireless communications are vulnerable to
malicious wiretap and attack due to the nature of broadcast. Thus, a lot of methods have been proposed
to safeguard the physical layer security (PLS) of communications [13–20], such as massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO), directional modulation, precise transmission, and artificial noise. Meanwhile,
the potential eavesdropping and attack on UAV networks are more serious due to the air-to-ground LoS
channel. Consequently, the communication security of UAV networks has also been widely investigated.
For instance, the authors of [21] tried to maximize the secrecy rate through jointly optimizing the UAV’s
trajectory and transmit power. To further improve PLS performance, the authors of [22] considered the
case of two UAVs, in which one was used to transmit confidential information (CI) while the other was
used to transmit the artificial noise (AN) to prevent eavesdroppers (Eves) from wiretapping. Furthermore,
unlike traditional PLS technologies that devote to improving the secrecy rate, covert communications are
dedicated to hiding the transmission behavior of the transmitter, which can provide high-level security
[23, 24]. As a result, [25] combined the UAV networks with covert communications, where the UAV’s
trajectory and transmit power were optimized to maximize the average covert transmission rate under
the transmission outage and covertness constraints.
However, the aforementioned literatures related to PLS all assumed that CI has infinite blocklength.
This assumption is impractical and can not meet the demands of some applications for 5G wireless system
on ultra-reliable and low-latency communication (URLLC), such as factory automation and autonomous
vehicles, which require at least 99.999% reliability within 1 ms end-to-end latency [26–28]. As a result,
the packet with finite blocklength will be used to meet the both stringent requirements on reliability and
latency. Under this condition, the law of large numbers is no longer true, and the thermal noise and
the distortions at the receiver can not be averaged out [29]. Consequently, the expression of secrecy rate
which leading to the results of [21,22,25] can not be used directly [30].
Motivated by the above reasons, in this paper, we study the UAV-enabled secure communication with
finite blocklength, where a UAV is used to transmit CI with finite blocklength to the legitimate user
(Bob) in the existence of Eve. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• For the first time, we consider the secure UAV communication with finite blocklength. The results
of information theory on finite blocklength bounds for wiretap channels are utilized to approximate the
average effective secrecy rate (AESR) of the considered system, which are quite different from the results
of the aforementioned works considering the infinite blocklength.
• We aim to maximize AESR subject to the UAV’s mobility and transmit power constraints by jointly
optimizing the UAV’s trajectory and transmit power. However, the formulated optimization problem is
non-convex and thus difficult to solve directly. Therefore, we first decompose the optimization problem
into two non-convex subproblems. Then the two subproblems are transformed into convex ones based
on the first-order approximation. Finally, an alternating iteration algorithm based on successive convex
approximate (SCA) technique is proposed to solve the formulated problem.
• Numerical results show that the proposed alternating iterative algorithm can significantly outperform
the benchmark scheme from the perspective of AESR. Besides, we can observe that the UAV trajectory
obtained by the proposed scheme tends to fly away from Eve to degrade Eve’s wiretap and thus improve
the communication security.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the system model and
formulate the optimization problem. An alternating iterative algorithm is proposed in Section 3 to solve
the formulated optimization problem. Numerical results are provided in Section 4 to demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed algorithm. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
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Figure 1 UAV-enabled secure communication system with finite blocklength.
2 System Model and Problem Formulation
2.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a UAV-enabled secure wireless communication system, where a UAV is
served as an aerial base station to transmit CI to Bob, while a potential Eve tries to wiretap CI. In contrast
to the conventional UAV-enabled secure wireless communication systems where infinite blocklength is
assumed for CI, we consider the case of CI with finite blocklength. For ease of presentation, we consider
a three dimension (3D) Cartesian coordinate system, where Bob and Eve are located at wb = [xb, yb, 0]
T
and we = [xe, ye, 0]
T , respectively. The trajectory of UAV within flight duration T can be expressed as
q(t) = [x(t), y(t), H]T , 0 6 t 6 T , where H denotes the fixed flight altitude. For the sake of simplicity, the
flight duration T is equally divided into N time slots with duration δt =
T
N . As a result, the trajectory of
UAV can be discretized as a sequence q[n] = [x[n], y[n], H]T , 1 6 n 6 N . Then, the mobility constraints
of UAV are given by
‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖ 6 Vmaxδt, n = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, (1a)
q[1] = qI , q[N ] = qF , (1b)
where Vmax denotes the maximum flight speed of UAV, qI = [xI , yI , H]
T and qF = [xF , yF , H]
T denote
the predetermined initial and final location of UAV, respectively. It is worth mentioning that the duration
of each time slot δt should be carefully considered. Firstly, δt should be sufficient small so that the UAV
can be treated as static within each time slot. Secondly, δt is greater than the time it takes to send one
block.
In this paper, all the nodes are assumed to be equipped with single antenna. Besides, we assume that the
communication links from UAV to Bob and Eve are dominated by LoS. Furthermore, the Doppler effect
caused by the motion of UAV is assumed to be perfectly compensated at Bob and Eve. Consequently,
the channel power gain from UAV to Bob in time slot n can be expressed as
hb[n] = ζ0d
−2
b [n] =
ζ0
‖q[n]−wb‖2 ,∀n, (2)
where db[n] = ‖q[n] − wb‖ denotes the distance from UAV to Bob in time slot n, and ζ0 denotes the
channel power gain at the reference distance d0 = 1 m. Similarly, the channel power gain from UAV to
Eve in time slot n can be expressed as
he[n] = ζ0d
−2
e [n] =
ζ0
‖q[n]−we‖2 ,∀n, (3)
where de[n] = ‖q[n]−we‖ denotes the distance from UAV to Eve in time slot n. Assume that the transmit
power of UAV in time slot n is denoted as P [n]. Taking the average and instantaneous power limits into
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accountant [21], the transmit power constraints are given by
1
N
N∑
n=1
P [n] 6 P¯ , (4a)
0 6 P [n] 6 Pmax,∀n, (4b)
where P¯ and Pmax denote the maximum average and instantaneous transmit power, respectively. Then,
according to [30] and [31], a lower bound on the secrecy rate in bits per channel use (BPCU) in time slot
n can be approximated as
Rs[n] =
[
log2(1 + γb[n])− log2(1 + γe[n])−
√
Vb[n]
L
Q−1(ε)
ln 2
−
√
Ve[n]
L
Q−1()
ln 2
]+
,∀n, (5)
where the operation [x]+ , max{x, 0}, and Q−1(x) is the inverse of the Gaussian Q-function Q(x) ,∫∞
x
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 dt. We note that L in (5) denotes the blocklength, ε and  denote the decoding error
probability at Bob and the information leakage at Eve, respectively. γb[n] and γe[n] in (5) given by
γb[n] =
P [n]hb[n]
σ2
=
ξ0P [n]
‖q[n]−wb‖2 ,∀n, (6)
γe[n] =
P [n]he[n]
σ2
=
ξ0P [n]
‖q[n]−we‖2 ,∀n, (7)
denote the signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve, respectively, where σ2 is the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) power at Bob and Eve, and ξ0 =
ζ0
σ2 . Vb[n] is the channel dispersion of Bob in
time slot n, which is given by [30,31]
Vb[n] = 1− (1 + γb[n])−2,∀n. (8)
Similarly, Ve[n] denotes the channel dispersion of Eve in time slot n, which is given by
Ve[n] = 1− (1 + γe[n])−2,∀n. (9)
As per (5), the average secrecy rate over N time slots is given by
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Rs[n]. (10)
2.2 Problem Formulation
Note that the decoding error probability at Bob can not be neglected due to the finite blocklength. As
such, our target is to maximize AESR [31] given by Rs(1−ε) via jointly optimizing the trajectory and the
transmit power of UAV under the mobility constraints and the transmit power constraints. The resultant
optimization problem is formulated as
max
Q,P
Rs(1− ε) (11a)
s.t. (1), (4), (11b)
where Q = {q[n],∀n} is the UAV trajectory and P = {P [n],∀n} is the transmit power of UAV over
N time slots. In (11a), the operation [x]+ is removed because if there exist some time slot n making
Rs[n] < 0, we can always set P [n] = 0 and then increase Rs[n] to 0 without violating the power constraints
(4). We note that problem (11) is non-convex and difficult to solve optimally due to the fact that the
expression of Rs is very complicated as well as Q and P are closely coupled in the objective function.
As such, in the next section, we propose an efficient algorithm to find a suboptimal solution to problem
(11).
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3 Alternating Iterative Algorithm for Problem (11)
To facilitate processing problem (11), we introduce slack variables Ub = {ub[n],∀n}, Ue = {ue[n],∀n},
Zb = {zb[n],∀n} and Ze = {ze[n],∀n}, then problem (11) can be reformulated as
max
Q,P,Ub,
Ue,Zb,Ze
1
N
N∑
n=1
R˜s[n](1− ε) (12a)
s.t. (1), (4), (12b)
ub[n] >
ξ0P [n]
‖q[n]−wb‖2 ,∀n, (12c)
ue[n] >
ξ0P [n]
‖q[n]−we‖2 ,∀n, (12d)
z2b [n] > 1− (1 + ub[n])−2,∀n, (12e)
z2e [n] > 1− (1 + ue[n])−2,∀n, (12f)
zb[n] > 0,∀n, (12g)
ze[n] > 0,∀n. (12h)
where
R˜s[n] = log2
(
1 +
ξ0P [n]
‖q[n]−wb‖2
)
− log2(1 + ue[n])− zb[n]
Q−1(ε)√
L ln 2
− ze[n]Q
−1()√
L ln 2
,∀n. (13)
We note that problem (12) is equivalent to problem (11) since the constraints (12c)-(12f) hold with
equality at the optimal solution. However, problem (12) is still non-convex and hard to solve because the
objective function (12a) is non-concave with respect to (w.r.t.) Q, P and Ue. Besides, constraints (12c)-
(12f) are non-convex. As a result, in the following, we first decompose problem (12) into two subproblems,
then we transform the two subproblems into convex optimization problems, and finally we develop an
alternating iteration algorithm and employ the SCA technique to solve the formulated problem.
3.1 Trajectory Optimization
For given feasible transmit power P, problem (12) can be simplified as
max
Q,Ub,
Ue,Zb,Ze
1
N
N∑
n=1
R˜s[n](1− ε) (14a)
s.t. (1), (12c)− (12h). (14b)
However, problem (14) is still non-convex because the objective function (14a) is non-concave, and con-
straints (12c)-(12f) are non-convex. In the following, we focus on transforming problem (14) into a convex
optimization problem.
To this end, we introduce slack variable Lb = {lb[n],∀n} and equivalently rewrite constraint (12c) as
ub[n] >
ξ0P [n]
lb[n]
,∀n, (15a)
‖q[n]−wb‖2 > lb[n],∀n. (15b)
Note that constraint (15a) is convex now, but constraint (15b) is still non-convex due to the superlevel
of a convex function. It is well known that a convex (concave) function is lower (upper) bounded by its
first-order Taylor expansion. This motivates us to use the first-order approximation technique to tackle
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the non-convex constraint (15b). Specifically, the term ‖q[n] − wb‖2 can be replaced by its first-order
Taylor expansion. Thus, for given feasible point qˆ[n], constraint (15b) can be approximated as
‖qˆ[n]−wb‖2 + 2(qˆ[n]−wb)T (q[n]− qˆ[n]) > lb[n],∀n, (16)
which is a convex constraint. So far, the non-convex constraint (12c) has been approximated as the
convex constraints (15a) and (16). Similarly, by introducing slack variable Le = {le[n],∀n}, the non-
convex constraint (12d) can be approximated as convex constraints
ue[n] >
ξ0P [n]
le[n]
,∀n, (17)
and
‖qˆ[n]−we‖2 + 2(qˆ[n]−we)T (q[n]− qˆ[n]) > le[n],∀n. (18)
For constraint (12e), we observe that it is in the form of a superlevel of a convex function, which can
be approximated by its first-order convex approximation. Consequently, for given feasible points zˆb[n]
and uˆb[n], constraint (12e) can be approximated as
zˆ2b [n] + 2zˆb[n](zb[n]− zˆb[n]) > 1− (1 + uˆb[n])−2 + 2(1 + uˆb[n])−3(ub[n]− uˆb[n]),∀n. (19)
Similarly, constraint (12f) can be approximated as constraint
zˆ2e [n] + 2zˆe[n](ze[n]− zˆe[n]) > 1− (1 + uˆe[n])−2 + 2(1 + uˆe[n])−3(ue[n]− uˆe[n]),∀n, (20)
where zˆe[n] and uˆe[n] are given feasible points.
For the objective function (14a), we observe that R˜s[n] in the objective function is jointly convex w.r.t.
‖q[n]−wb‖2 and ub[n]. Consequently, the first-order approximation technique can be used to construct
a lower bound of R˜s[n], which can be expressed as
R˜s[n] > log2
(
1 +
ξ0P [n]
‖qˆ[n]−wb‖2
)
− ξ0P [n](‖q[n]−wb‖
2 − ‖qˆ[n]−wb‖2)
(‖qˆ[n]−wb‖2)(‖qˆ[n]−wb‖2 + ξ0P [n]) ln 2−
log2(1 + uˆe[n])−
ue[n]− uˆe[n]
(1 + uˆe[n]) ln 2
− zb[n]Q
−1(ε)√
L ln 2
− ze[n]Q
−1()√
L ln 2
, R˜lbs,q[n],∀n.
(21)
Following the above transformation, problem (14) can be reformulated as
max
Q,Ub,Ue,
Zb,Ze,Lb,Le
1
N
N∑
n=1
R˜lbs,q[n](1− ε) (22a)
s.t. (1), (12g), (12h), (15a), (16)− (20). (22b)
Problem (22) is now a convex optimization problem, which can be efficiently solved by optimization tools
such as CVX [32].
3.2 Transmit Power Optimization
For given feasible UAV trajectory Q, problem (12) can be simplified as
max
P,Ub,Ue,Zb,Ze
1
N
N∑
n=1
R˜s[n](1− ε) (23a)
s.t. (4), (12c)− (12h). (23b)
Obviously, problem (23) is non-convex due to the convexity of the second term of R˜s[n] and the non-
convexity of constraints (12e) and (12f). Similar to the process in the previous subsection, constraints
(12e) and (12f) can be approximated as constraint (19) and (20), respectively. For the objective function
Wang Y T, et al. Sci China Inf Sci 7
Algorithm 1 Alternating iterative algorithm for problem (11)
1: Initialize {Q0, P0, U0b , U0e, Z0b , Z0e}; Let r = 0.
2: repeat
3: Solve problem (22) for given {Qr, Pr, Urb , Ure, Zrb , Zre} and obtain the optimal solution {Qr+1,
Ur+1b , U
r+1
e , Z
r+1
b , Z
r+1
e }.
4: Let {Urb ,Ure,Zrb ,Zre}={Ur+1b ,Ur+1e ,Zr+1b ,Zr+1e }.
5: Solve problem (25) for given {Qr+1, Urb , Ure, Zrb , Zre} and obtain the optimal solution {Pr+1,
Ur+1b , U
r+1
e , Z
r+1
b , Z
r+1
e }.
6: Let r = r + 1.
7: until the fractional increase of the objective function is below a threshold τ .
(23a), we can employ the first-order approximation to construct a lower bound of R˜s[n], which is detailed
as
R˜s[n] > log2
(
1 +
ξ0P [n]
‖q[n]−wb‖2
)
− log2(1 + uˆe[n])−
ue[n]− uˆe[n]
(1 + uˆe[n]) ln 2
− zb[n]Q
−1(ε)√
L ln 2
− ze[n]Q
−1()√
L ln 2
, R˜lbs,p[n],∀n.
(24)
Then, problem (23) can be approximated as
max
P,Ub,Ue,Zb,Ze
1
N
N∑
n=1
R˜lbs,p[n](1− ε) (25a)
s.t. (4), (12c), (12d), (12g), (12h), (19), (20). (25b)
We note that problem (25) is a convex optimization problem, which can be efficiently solved by CVX [32].
3.3 Overall Algorithm
In the previous two subsections, we have transformed the trajectory optimization subproblem and the
transmit power optimization subproblem into convex optimization problems. In this subsection, we
develop an alternating iteration algorithm based on the SCA technique to solve the two subproblems
alternatively. Following the principle of the SCA technique, at each iteration, the current optimal solu-
tion to each subproblem gradually approximates the solution to the original optimization problem (11).
Furthermore, the optimal solution to each subproblem is also feasible to problem (11), since the feasible
set of each subproblem is stricter than that of problem (11). As such, the proposed algorithm can obtain
a suboptimal solution to the original optimization problem (11). The detailed algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1.
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we present the numerical results to demonstrate the performance of our proposed algo-
rithm. For ease of presentation, the proposed algorithm, i.e., joint optimization of the UAV’s trajectory
and transmit power, is denoted as the JTPO scheme. For comparison, we consider a benchmark, i.e.,
transmit power optimization with fixed trajectory (denoted as the POFT scheme), where the transmit
power is optimized by solving problem (25), and the line segment trajectory in [25] is adopted. The
simulation parameters are set as: Pmax = 20 dBm, P¯ =
1
2Pmax, H = 100 m, δt = 1 s, Vmax = 10 m/s,
ξ0 = 60 dB, ε = 10
−5,  = 10−2, τ = 10−6, wb = [0, 0, 0]T m, we = [400, 0, 0]T m, qI = [200, 100, H]T m
and qF = [200,−100, H]T m.
Fig. 2 plots the UAV trajectories obtained by the JTPO and the POFT schemes versus different flight
duration T with blocklength L = 400. In this figure, when T = 60 s, we observe that the UAV first flies to
a certain location around Bob at the maximum speed, then hovers at this location as long as possible, and
finally files to the final location at the maximum speed. We note that the hovering location is directly
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Figure 2 UAV trajectories sampled every 3 s for both schemes with L = 400.
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Figure 3 Average effective secrecy rate versus T .
above Bob while the eavesdropper is directly below Bob. As such, the hovering location is a tradoff
between the communication performance and the secure performance. Compared with the line segment
trajectory obtained by the POFT scheme, the trajectory obtained by our proposed scheme always flies
away from Eve to degrade Eve’s eavesdropping. When T = 42 s, the UAV is not allowed to fly to Bob
due to the limited flight duration. Therefore, for both schemes, the UAV flies at the maximum speed
from the initial location to the final location via different paths.
In Fig. 3, we plot the curves of AESR of both schemes versus different flight duration T . As expected,
the JTPO scheme outperforms the POFT scheme thanks to the trajectory optimization. We can also
observe that AESRs of both schemes increase as T increases because a larger T allows the UAV to hover
at the hovering location for a longer time. In addition, AESRs obtained by both schemes increase as L
increases, which is consistent with the results of (5).
Fig. 4 shows the transmit power of UAV over N time slots obtained by both schemes with T = 60 s
and L = 400. We observe that Fig. 4 is symmetrical. Thus, we only analyze the first 30 time slots. In the
first several time slots, we observe that the transmit power obtained by both schemes is equal to zero.
This is because the rate from the UAV to Eve is higher than the rate from the UAV to Bob, which makes
a positive secrecy rate cannot be guaranteed. Then, the UAV’s transmit power increases as the UAV
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Figure 4 Transmit power for both schemes with T = 60 s and L = 400.
gets closer to Bob, and finally remains constant when the UAV reaches the hovering location. We also
observe that both the proposed JTPO and the benchmark POFT schemes increase the transmit power
of UAV when the UAV gets closer to Bob and reduce the transmit power of UAV when the UAV gets
farther away from Bob.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the UAV-enabled secure communication with finite blocklength. Under
the condition of fixed blocklength, decoding error probabilities at Bob, and information leakage at Eve,
we aimed to maximize AESR by jointly designing UAV’s trajectory and transmit power. However,
the resultant optimization problem was non-convex and difficult to solve directly. As such, we first
decomposed the formulated optimization problem into the trajectory optimization and the transmit
power optimization subproblems. Then we reformulated the two subproblems into convex optimization
problems based on the first-order approximation technique. Finally, we developed an alternating iteration
algorithm based on the SCA technique to solve the two subproblems iteratively. Numerical results showed
that the proposed joint optimization scheme can achieve significantly better secure performance relative
to a benchmark scheme.
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